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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
         Appellant Kenneth Gateward was convicted after a jury 
trial for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 
U.S.C.  922(g)(1).  Gateward challenges the constitutionality of 
that statute as beyond Congress' regulatory power under the 
Commerce Clause. 
                                I. 
         Gateward was indicted by a federal grand jury on a 
single count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.  
Such possession is prohibited under 18 U.S.C.  922(g), which, in 
relevant part, makes it "unlawful for any person . . . who has 
been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year" to "possess in or affecting 
commerce, any firearm or ammunition."   
         At trial, the government presented testimony from 
Officer Joseph A. Caruthers of the Philadelphia Police Firearms 
Identification Unit.  Officer Caruthers testified that the 
firearm confiscated from Gateward, an Astro .380 semi-automatic 
handgun, had been manufactured in Spain and imported by a 
Virginia distributor.  See App. at 31a.  In addition, Gateward 
stipulated that available testimony from an agent of the Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms would establish that the firearm 
had been shipped or transported in interstate commerce.  See App. 
at 39a-40a.  Gateward also stipulated that he had before been 
convicted of a felony.  See App. at 40a.   
         A jury found Gateward guilty, and the district court 
sentenced him to 235 months imprisonment, 5 years supervised 
release, and a $50 special assessment.  Gateward now appeals from 
his judgment of conviction, arguing that the felon firearm 
statute on which it is based is unconstitutional. 
                               II. 
         Gateward's constitutional argument consists wholly of 
reference to the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States 
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).  There the Court held invalid 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C.  922(q), which 
prohibited firearm possession on school grounds or within 1000 
feet thereof, as beyond Congress' commerce power, declaring that 
"[t]he Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a 
requirement that the possession be connected in any way to 
interstate commerce."  115 S. Ct. at 1626.  Gateward would have 
us view  922(g) as the Lopez Court did  922(q)--as essentially 
noncommercial, without the requisite nexus with interstate 
commerce, and accordingly unconstitutional. 
         We note initially that Gateward's constitutional 
challenge is raised for the first time on appeal, and would 
therefore ordinarily be reviewable only for plain error.  SeeUnited States 
v. $184,505.01 in U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160, 1165 
n. 12 (3d Cir. 1995).  However, the Lopez decision on which 
Gateward's claim depends was issued only after he was found 
guilty (though before judgment was entered).  Under these 
circumstances, we move directly to the substantive question 
presented. 
         The Supreme Court has twice addressed the interstate 
commerce aspect of 18 U.S.C. App.  1202(a), predecessor statute 
to  922(g)(1), which made any felon "who receives, possesses, or 
transports in commerce or affecting commerce . . . any firearm" 
guilty of a federal offense.  18 U.S.C. App.  1202(a) (repealed 
1986).   
         In United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971), the 
defendant had been convicted under  1202(a) for possessing a 
firearm, even though the government had made no attempt to show 
that the gun had been possessed "in commerce or affecting 
commerce."  That was because the government read the statutory 
phrase "in commerce or affecting commerce" as applying only to 
"transports" and not to "receives" or "possesses."   The Supreme 
Court disagreed, concluding that the phrase modified the words 
"receives" and "possesses" as well.   
         The Court found the statutory language ambiguous, but 
settled on this narrower reading because "unless Congress conveys 
its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly 
changed the federal-state balance."  404 U.S. at 349.  By 
applying the jurisdictional element to possessions and receipts, 
as well as transports, the Court avoided the question of the 
statute's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.  See id.at 351 
("[C]onsistent with our regard for the sensitive relation 
between federal and state criminal jurisdiction, our reading 
preserves as an element of all the offenses a requirement suited 
to federal criminal jurisdiction alone."); see also Lopez, 115 S. 
Ct. at 1631.   
         Six years later, in Scarborough v. United States, 431 
U.S. 563 (1977), the Supreme Court established that proof that 
the possessed firearm had previously traveled in interstate 
commerce was sufficient to satisfy the statute's "in commerce or 
affecting commerce" nexus requirement. 
         We do not understand Lopez to undercut the 
Bass/Scarborough proposition that the jurisdictional element "in 
or affecting commerce" keeps the felon firearm law well inside 
the constitutional fringes of the Commerce Clause.  The LopezCourt 
invalidated  922(q) because "by its terms [it] has nothing 
to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however 
broadly one might define those terms," and because " 922(q) 
contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through 
case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question 
affects interstate commerce."  115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.   
         By contrast, Congress drafted  922(g) to include a 
jurisdictional element, one which requires a defendant felon to 
have possessed a firearm "in or affecting commerce."  If 
anything, the Court's opinion in Lopez highlights that crucial 
difference, and buttresses the validity of the felon firearm 
statute.  See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (contrasting  922(q)'s 
lack of a jurisdictional element with  1202(a)'s nexus in Bassbetween 
firearm possession and commerce).  
         In United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir.) cert.denied, 
116 S. Ct. 681 (1995), this court upheld 18 U.S.C.  
2119, the federal anti-carjacking statute, against a post-LopezCommerce 
Clause challenge.  Noting that "section 2119 is limited 
to cars that have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce," we 
observed that "the Supreme Court's decisions in Bass and 
Scarborough compel the conclusion that the jurisdictional element 
in section 2119 provides a nexus sufficient to protect the 
statute from constitutional infirmity."  Id. at 585.   
         We therefore join eight courts of appeals in upholding 
the constitutionality of  922(g)(1) as a valid exercise of the 
commerce power.  See United States v. Bradford, 78 F.3d 1216, 
1222-23 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 
387, 389-90 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bates, 77 F.3d 
1101, 1103-04 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Turner, 77 F.3d 
887, 889 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sorrentino, 72 F.3d 
294, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Hinton, No. 95-5095, 
1995 WL 623876, at **2 (4th Cir. Oct. 25, 1995) (unpublished), 
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1026 (1996); United States v. Bolton, 68 
F.3d 396, 400 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 966 (1995); 
United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379, 1383-84 (9th Cir.), cert.denied, 
116 S. Ct. 543 (1995). 
         Gateward also argues that the indictment charging him 
with violation of  922(g) contained no reference to possession 
of the firearm having been "in or affecting commerce."  He is 
mistaken.  The two-sentence indictment charges him with having 
"knowingly possessed in and affecting commerce, a firearm."   
         Gateward last contends that "there was no attempt by 
the Government to show that the firearm had been possessed in or 
affecting commerce."  Brief of Appellant at 13.  Again, he is 
incorrect.  The prosecution produced testimony that the firearm 
seized from Gateward had moved in interstate commerce, and 
Gateward stipulated to additional testimony establishing that 
fact.  Gateward has failed to show that Bass and Scarborough are 
inapplicable here.  We are satisfied that the government has 
shown the required link to commerce by both proof introduced at 
trial and the stipulation, which may account for Gateward's 
earlier failure to dispute it.  See Trial Transcript, Mar. 15, 
1995, at 197 (Closing Argument). Accordingly, we find no merit in 
Gateward's arguments.    
                               III. 
         For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
district court's judgment of conviction. 
 
 
 
 
